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The Better Local Government Act versus Municipal Democracy
SIMON ARCHER & ERIN SOBAT
IN AN ERA MARKED BY THE RISE of “illiberal democracies,” the rule of law we thought we knew
is being tested. Courts have been asked to engage with the expanded and extraordinary use of
executive and parliamentary powers everywhere—most recently in the United Kingdom (on the
use of the executive’s prerogative powers to call elections against the will of Parliament) and the
United States (on the legality of executive orders by the President). Locally it has taken the form
of interference by the provincial government of Ontario in municipal elections, including the threat
of invoking the “notwithstanding clause” in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to shield such
interference from effective constitutional oversight.
This special volume of the Journal of Law and Social Policy examines and contextualizes
these acts of interference. On 27 July 2018, the Honourable Doug Ford, newly elected Progressive
Conservative Premier of Ontario, announced that his government would introduce legislation to
reduce the size of Toronto City Council from forty-seven to twenty-five ward seats. This, despite
the fact that the 2018 municipal election period had already begun on 1 May 2018 and was well
underway; that voting day was scheduled for 22 October 2018; and that the City had recently
undertaken an extensive, four-year public consultation on ward boundaries, which resulted in City
Council increasing the number of wards from forty-four to forty-seven. Ignoring the requirements
of the City of Toronto Act, 2006,1 the government had not previously consulted the City, provided
notice about this drastic change, or even campaigned on the issue before being elected the month
before.
It is helpful to note that the City and Province (under the former provincial government)
had previously worked out a compromise for determining the structure and process of local
government. This negotiation of jurisdiction was enacted in the City of Toronto Act, 2006: there
would be a lengthy process to determine ward boundaries (taking into account “effective
representation” principles developed for the purpose of section 3 democratic rights under the
Charter) and a requirement that both the City and Province consult on any changes. The ward
boundary review process began in 2013 and concluded in 2017, following several rounds of
community consultations, many committee and Council meetings, and significant changes to the
city’s governance model.2 The City of Toronto’s lengthy and detailed ward boundary review
process was upheld on review by the Ontario Municipal Board. 3 Yet the City’s long-laboured
decision was over-ridden by a former City councillor (now Premier) who apparently believed from
the start of the City’s review that the ward boundaries should simply match federal and provincial
electoral boundaries.
On 30 July 2018, the provincial government introduced Bill 5, the Better Local
Government Act, 2018 (Bill 5 or the Act), for first reading in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario.4
The Bill would amend the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (Schedule 1), the Municipal Act, 2001


Simon Archer is a Partner at Goldblatt Partners LLP in Toronto. Erin Sobat is a third year JD student at Osgoode
Hall Law School. The authors would like to thank all the journal editors for their assistance with the special volume
and this introduction.
1
SO 2006, c 11, Sched A [COTA].
2
“Toronto Ward Boundary Review,” online: <drawthelines.ca> [perma.cc/6MUC-JAF6].
3
Di Ciano v Toronto (City), 2017 CanLII 85757 (ON LPAT).
4
Better Local Government Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 11 [Bill 5].
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(Schedule 2), and the Municipal Elections Act, 1996 (Schedule 3) in order to re-divide the City’s
wards to match existing provincial ward boundaries, to reset the nomination period for the 2018
election, and to remove the City’s power to change its own ward structure. This also affected the
ward structure for the Toronto District School Board trustee elections, which were required to
align with the structure for City Council elections.5 Bill 5 further cancelled upcoming elections for
the chairs of several regional municipalities. The effects of these changes were clear: fewer
candidates would run, incumbents would (as usual) remain in office, fewer candidates and
eventually councillors would be women, racialized, or LGBTQ people, and City Council would
continue to be unreflective of the City’s population as a whole. 6 Currently, Toronto, whose
population is only about fifty per cent white, is represented municipally by an overwhelmingly
white council. There is one Black councillor and three East Asian councillors; the remaining
twenty-one are white, as is the Mayor. Other consequences seemed likely: for example, ward sizes
would double, and servicing those wards be more difficult for elected representatives.
Despite significant outcry from politicians, candidates, and residents in the affected
municipalities, and Toronto in particular, Bill 5 quickly passed through the Legislature and
received Royal Assent on 14 August 2018. This was 105 days after Toronto’s municipal election
campaigning had begun and sixty-nine days before the election. Several constitutional court
challenges were filed almost immediately on behalf of candidates and electors and were heard
together on an expedited basis on 31 August 2018.7 The applicants asked the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice to strike down Schedules 1 and 3 of the Act, both dealing with the City of Toronto
elections, as well as Regulations made pursuant to the legislation, dealing with ward boundaries
and election rules (collectively, the “impugned provisions”).8
On 10 September 2018, Justice Belobaba, of the Superior Court, declared the impugned
provisions of Bill 5 unconstitutional and of no force and effect. 9 Although many legal theories
were argued before the Court—several of which will be explored in more detail below—Justice
Belobaba found that the impugned provisions unjustifiably infringed the freedom of expression of
candidates and voters under section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He applied the
test for infringements of section 2(b) from Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General) (“Irwin
Toy”), which asks, first, whether the activity in question falls within the scope of freedom of
expression, and second, whether the purpose or effect of the legislation is to interfere with that
expression.10 Justice Belobaba determined that Bill 5 substantially interfered with the expression
of City Council candidates, which clearly fell within the scope of section 2(b), by interrupting the
election process mid-stream. He also observed that reducing the number of City wards from fortyseven to twenty-five, along with the corresponding increase in ward size population from an
average of about sixty-one thousand to one hundred and eleven thousand, substantially interfered
5

O Reg 391/18, made under the Education Act, RSO 1990, c E2, required Toronto school boards to realign their
trustee ward boundaries. On 30 July 2018, Ontario directed that school boards communicate their intended number
and distribution of trustees to the Ministry of Education by 14 August 2018, failing which the Minister would impose
distribution plans on boards: City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Factum of
the Intervenor – Toronto District School Board) at paras 4–6 [SCC Factum (TDSB)].
6
See e.g. City of Toronto et al v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 5151 (Affidavits of Myer Siematycki &
Mariana Valverde describing the likely impacts of Bill 5) (on file with the authors).
7
The development of full constitutional challenges to Bill 5 in approximately two weeks, including multiple applicants,
expert evidence, and full application records, is an indication of the strength of opposition and extraordinary effort to
defeat this interference in the municipal elections.
8
See Bill 5, supra note 4; O Reg 407/18, 2018 and 2022 Regular Elections – Special Rules; O Reg 408/18, Wards.
9
City of Toronto et al v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 5151 [Application Reasons].
10
[1989] 1 SCR 927 at 978.
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with voters’ freedom of expression by denying them a vote that can result in “effective
representation.”11
Under section 1, Justice Belobaba found the Province had not established that the
impugned provisions had a pressing and substantial objective, nor that they were minimally
impairing. When he inquired into the rationale behind the legislation, noting that the changes did
not actually address the stated objective of improving parity in ward sizes, Justice Belobaba wrote
that the only response he heard was “crickets.”12
The government immediately appealed and sought a stay of the Court’s order. In addition,
the Progressive Conservatives tabled Bill 31, equivalent legislation to Bill 5 that additionally
invoked section 33 of the Charter (the “notwithstanding clause”) in attempt to shield it from
constitutional scrutiny if the Charter infringement was upheld.13
The deployment of the notwithstanding clause—only hours following Justice Belobaba’s
decision—prompted opposition, dismay, and debate over the role of this sparingly-used
constitutional tool. Some commentators saw a Premier using the Constitution’s most extraordinary
provision to pursue a personal grievance against a municipal council of which he had previously
been a member. Petitions opposing its use were circulated, current and former politicians spoke
out, and newspaper opinion pages weighed in.14 It even became an international headline. 15
Then, on 19 September 2018, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal granted a stay of
Justice Belobaba’s order pending a full decision on the appeal.16 For an appellate court to stay a
lower court decision pending appeal, the applicant must normally demonstrate that there is a
serious issue to be tried; that it will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and that the
balance of convenience favours a stay pending disposition of the appeal. 17 However, this test
assumes that the stay will operate as a temporary measure. Where the outcome of the stay
application will practically determine the rights of the parties, the court instead asks, on the first
prong, whether there is a strong likelihood that the appeal would succeed. This was such a case
since the ruling would decide the ward structure for the impending election.18
In concluding that there was a strong likelihood the appeal would succeed, the Court held
that the City was actually advancing a “positive rights” claim for the continued existence of a
Belobaba J did not make any ruling based on section 3 (democratic rights) of the Charter. The concept of “effective
representation” was originally developed in the context of section 3 jurisprudence.
12
Application Reasons, supra note 9 at paras 76–77.
13
Bill 31, Efficient Local Government Act, 2018, 1st Sess, 24 Leg, Ontario, 2018 (first reading 12 September 2018).
14
See e.g. Richard Moon, “Doug Ford’s use of the notwithstanding clause reduces democracy to majority rule,” CBC
News (13 September 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/doug-ford-notwithstanding-1.4821302>
[perma.cc/9NXT-C363]; Alex Ballingall, “Charter of Rights architects – including Jean Chrétien – condemn Doug
Ford’s
use
of
notwithstanding
clause,”
The
Star
(14
September
2018),
online:
<www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/09/14/charter-of-rights-architects-including-jean-chrtien-condemn-dougfords-use-of-notwithstanding-clause.html> [perma.cc/QYF5-5SAL]; Lorraine Weinrib, “Doug Ford can’t apply the
notwithstanding clause retroactively to impede democracy,” Globe and Mail (18 September 2018), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-doug-ford-cant-apply-the-notwithstanding-clause-retroactively-to/>
[perma.cc/AZ9Y-GP9A].
15
See e.g. “Amnesty Condemns ‘disgraceful’ use of obscure clause to cut Toronto council,” BBC News (13 September
2018), online: <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45478934> [perma.cc/PK95-PEJT]; Richard Poplak, “A
Populist Has Exposed a Sinkhole in Canada’s Democracy,” The Atlantic (28 September 2018), online:
<www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/a-populist-challenge-to-the-rule-of-law-in-canada/571114/>
[perma.cc/A6VS-4Z2Z].
16
Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONCA 761 [Stay Reasons].
17
Ibid at para 9; see also RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311.
18
Stay Reasons, supra note 16 at para 10.
11
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statutory platform—the 47-ward election.19 Despite this, Justice Belobaba had applied the Irwin
Toy framework instead of the test for section 2(b) positive rights claims from Baier v Alberta
(Baier).20 Baier dealt with a challenge to legislation that blocked teachers from running in school
board elections. The teachers argued that this restriction on their candidacy violated section 2(b),
while Alberta responded that section 2(b) did not guarantee candidacy rights to any particular class
of persons. A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the province, finding that the legislation
did not prevent teachers from expressing themselves on education issues generally. The Court also
adopted three criteria for establishing a successful positive rights claim under section 2(b), based
on the test it had previously articulated under section 2(d) (freedom of association). A positive 2(b)
claim requires, first, that the claim is grounded in a fundamental freedom of expression rather than
in access to a particular statutory regime; second, that the purpose or effect of the legislation is to
interfere with that expression; and third, that the government is responsible for the inability to
exercise the fundamental freedom. 21 Here, the Court of Appeal felt that Justice Belobaba erred by
failing to consider these criteria. The panel was also concerned that he improperly considered
section 3 of the Charter (democratic rights) in his analysis of the section 2(b) infringement.22
Practically speaking, the stay ruling decided the case, as the appeal would not be heard for
many months. In the meantime, the Toronto municipal election proceeded under Bill 5 on the basis
of twenty-five wards, and the Provincial Government did not move Bill 31 past second reading in
the legislature.
Arguments on the full appeal were heard by a five-judge panel on 10 and 11 June 2019.
Reasons were released one year from the date of the original stay judgment, on 19 September
2019. Once again, the panel heard several theories of the case, not all of which formed part of
Justice Belobaba’s judgment in the court below. The Court of Appeal panel split on the issue, with
a three-judge majority overturning Justice Belobaba’s decision. 23 Justice Miller, writing for the
majority, held the following:
•
•
•

•

Section 2(b) of the Charter does not guarantee “effective expression” or the
effectiveness of expression.24
The City was advancing a positive rights claim (i.e., the continued existence of a
statutory platform—the 47-ward election) but did not meet the test for such a claim.25
Section 2(b) of the Charter does not require that a vote in a municipal election provide
for “effective representation” (a different concept than effective expression). This
protection instead flows from section 3 of the Charter, which explicitly does not apply
to municipal elections.26
Unwritten constitutional principles cannot be used as an independent basis to invalidate
legislation.27

19

Ibid at para 15.
2007 SCC 31 [Baier]. Belobaba J held that once the Province has opted to provide a certain electoral structure and
an election has begun, expressive activity in connection with that election is protected from interference under the
Irwin Toy test: Application Reasons, supra note 9 at para 37. However, he did not reference Baier on this issue.
21
Baier, supra note 20 at para 30.
22
Stay Reasons, supra note 16 at paras 12, 17.
23
Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732 [Appeal Reasons].
24
Ibid at paras 41–46.
25
Ibid at paras 47–69.
26
Ibid at paras 70–76.
27
Ibid at paras 81–89.
20
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•

Unwritten constitutional principles do not limit the Province’s jurisdiction over
municipal institutions pursuant to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.28

In contrast, Justice MacPherson, writing for the minority, held that Bill 5 was
unconstitutional because it unjustifiably interfered with the exercise of free expression rights in
the middle of an election process. Justice MacPherson found the majority’s characterization of
candidates’ expressive activities as including only “a person’s past communications” to be far too
narrow. Instead, he accepted that in the election context, the expression protected by section 2(b)
“expands to encompass a framework for the full deliberative engagement of voters, incumbents,
new candidates, volunteers, donors, campaign organizers and staff, and the media, throughout a
pre-determined, stable election period.”29 In his view, because candidates’ and voters’ expressive
activities unfold and intersect within the established terms of an election, to upend these terms
mid-stream does not merely render their free expression less effective—it renders the expression
meaningless.30
Justice MacPherson also disagreed with the majority that the City’s section 2(b) argument
represented a positive rights claim. He distinguished the case of Baier on this point. In that case,
the impugned legislation was enacted two years prior to the election itself, not three months after
it had started. In this case, Justice MacPherson found that the issue was not exclusion from an
electoral platform, but protection from the mid-stream destruction and replacement of that
platform.31 In other words, the City’s plea was for non-interference in an election that had already
begun.
Several of the original applicants abandoned the litigation prior to or following the Court
of Appeal judgment.32 However, on direction from City Council, the City of Toronto sought leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was granted on 26 March 2020.33 That appeal is
now scheduled to be heard on 16 March 2021.
There is no true remedy for the 2018 municipal election. The election took place in October
of that year and the new, twenty-five-member Council has been making governance decisions ever
since (including the reallocation of councillor budgets and responsibilities in accordance with the
new ward structure). However, the case remains of keen interest for those concerned with the legal
status of local government. The central problematic—that municipal elections are not protected by
democratic rights guaranteed under section 3 of the Charter and exempted from the application of
the notwithstanding clause—has never been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court. As a result,
constitutional challenges to changes in municipal governance are framed as violations of free
expression or equality rights, or of unwritten constitutional principles of democracy and the rule
of law.34

28

Ibid at paras 90–95.
Ibid at para 117.
30
Ibid at para 123.
31
Appeal Reasons, supra note 23 at para 132. Although Belobaba J did not address the Baier framework, MacPherson
JA’s analysis was otherwise consistent with that of the court below.
32
Given that the election had already occurred, the individual applicants were likely hesitant to put further resources
into the case.
33
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC). The Court of Appeal determined that it
was appropriate to allow the City continued standing in place of the other applicants who had abandoned the appeal:
Appeal Reasons, supra note 23 at paras 24–29.
34
See e.g. East York (Borough) v Ontario (Attorney General), 1997 CanLII 12263 (ON SC).
29

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021

5

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 34 [2021], Art. 1

Taking the question to the extreme degree, the Court of Appeal asked counsel for the
Attorney General whether the Province had the power to eliminate municipal elections altogether:
the reply was, necessarily, “yes.”35 In an era in which approximately eighty per cent of Canadians
live in cities,36 and the most populous of those cities have economies larger than many provinces,37
the asymmetry in our constitutional protections of democratic rights becomes ever more
pronounced. Indeed, more recent developments continue to highlight this issue. In October 2020,
the Ontario government introduced Bill 218, the Supporting Ontario’s Recovery and Municipal
Elections Act, 2020, which would enact legislation to shield individuals and organizations from
certain legal liabilities related to the COVID-19 virus.38 However, this Bill would also amend the
Municipal Elections Act, 1996 to ban municipalities from implementing ranked-ballot voting in
municipal elections.39 The government has stated that this change will make “the electoral process
consistent across municipal, provincial and federal elections” 40 and that it will save municipalities
money.41 Without any prior consultation, this move once again reverses a decision of the previous
provincial government to devolve authority and choice over local electoral procedures to
municipalities.42 Like with Bill 5, several municipalities and commentators have criticized the Bill
and questioned the motivations behind this sudden change.43
Against this backdrop, the case of Bill 5 raises numerous critical questions about local
democracy. Why do we have the constitutional arrangements that we do? When were
municipalities developed? For what purposes? How do they interact with other orders of
35

Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732 (Oral argument, Appellant).
See e.g. “World Urbanization Prospects 2018 – Country Profiles: Canada,” online: United Nations – Department of
Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division <population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/> [perma.cc/3B59JHY4]; Statistics Canada, “Canada’s population estimates: Subprovincial areas, July 1, 2019” (13 February 2020),
online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200213/dq200213a-eng.htm> [perma.cc/JF8S-TEK4].
37
See e.g. Statistics Canada, “Measuring the economy, region by region” (30 January 2017), online:
<www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/blog/cs/economy> [perma.cc/4TQT-XLQK]; Conference Board of Canada, “Cross City
Comparison: Real GDP Growth” (2020), online: <www.conferenceboard.ca/topics/economics/metro/ccc.aspx>
[perma.cc/H975-XWBK].
38
Bill 218, An Act to enact the Supporting Ontario’s Recovery Act, 2020 respecting certain proceedings relating to
the coronavirus (COVID-19), to amend the Municipal Elections Act, 1996 and to revoke a regulation, 1st Sess, 42nd
Parl, Ontario, 2020 (assented to 20 November 2020), Sched 1.
39
Ibid, Sched 2.
40
Government of Ontario, News Release, “Ontario Protects Workers, Volunteers and Organizations Who Make
Honest Efforts to Follow COVID-19 Public Health Guidelines and Laws” (20 October 2020), online:
<news.ontario.ca/en/release/58886/ontario-protects-workers-volunteers-and-organizations-who-make-honestefforts-to-follow-covid-19-pub> [perma.cc/FV43-3P9Q].
41
See e.g. Daryl Newcombe, “Province’s financial justification to end ranked ballots challenged,” CTV News (21
October 2020), online: <london.ctvnews.ca/province-s-financial-justification-to-end-ranked-ballots-challenged1.5154512> [perma.cc/Q6A8-BXYW].
42
See Municipal Elections Modernization Act, 2016, SO 2016, c15 – Bill 181 (assented to 9 June 2016); O Reg
310/16: Ranked Ballot Elections. The City of London was the first Ontario municipality to implement ranked ballots
in its 2018 election, with other municipalities considering the option at the time Bill 218 was announced.
43
See e.g. David Rider, “He gave Ontario cities the right to try a new voting system. Now Ted McMeekin can’t
understand why Doug Ford is taking it away,” The Star (23 October 2020), online:
<www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2020/10/23/he-gave-ontario-cities-the-right-to-try-a-new-voting-system-now-tedmcmeekin-cant-understand-why-doug-ford-is-taking-it-away.html> [perma.cc/MHH8-CDBA]; Mary Baxter,
“‘There should be local choice’: London fights to keep ranked-ballot voting,” TVO (30 October 2020), online:
<www.tvo.org/article/there-should-be-local-choice-london-fights-to-keep-ranked-ballot-voting> [perma.cc/28YWRR35]. Premier Doug Ford has claimed that the ranked-ballot process is confusing, stating that, “We don’t need any
more complications on ranked ballots and we’re just gonna do the same way as we’ve been doing since 1867 — first
past the post … [people] don’t have to be confused, it’s very simple” (see Rider, ibid).
36
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government and other regulatory imperatives? How have they realized or discouraged “effective
representation”? What alternatives exist?
This special volume explores these questions. We begin here by framing the contributions
within a broader consideration of the legal problem and the ways in which the applicants have tried
to resolve it. That is, we will outline the various theories put before the courts that attempt to
overcome the central problem of the lack of constitutional status for municipalities in Canada.
Each of these theories proposes some method of protecting the integrity of municipal democratic
processes from interference. In principle, that protection could be extended to municipalities by a
constitutional amendment listing them as the third level of government protected by section 3 of
the Charter. However, given the requirement for provincial consent to such an amendment, it
seems certain that some other approach will be required. Following the discussion of these legal
theories, we summarize the individual contributions to the special volume. Each of these pieces
speak to the wider historical, social, and political context within which these theories operate.

I. THE CASE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The City of Toronto has been granted leave to appeal from the judgment of the Ontario Court of
Appeal. The Attorney General of Ontario (AGO) is the Respondent on appeal. As of the date of
writing, the Supreme Court has approved fourteen intervenors, with one additional application
pending.44 Only the City and the Toronto District School Board have filed factums with the
Court.45 However, the various parties’ arguments are contained in their applications for leave to
appeal or intervene46 as well as their factums at the Court of Appeal (where applicable). 47
Intervenors aligned with the Appellant are the Toronto District School Board, David Asper
Centre for Constitutional Rights, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Centre for Free Expression
at Ryerson University, CityPlace Residents’ Association, Durham Community Legal Clinic,
International Commission of Jurists (Canada), Progress Toronto, Federation of Canadian
Municipalities, Métis Nations of Ontario and Alberta, Fair Voting British Columbia, and a group
of four former Mayors of Toronto: John Sewell, the Honourable Art Eggleton, Barbara Hall, and
David Miller. Intervenors aligned with the Respondent are the Canadian Constitution Foundation
and—at least on some issues—the Attorneys General of Canada and British Columbia.48

Supreme Court of Canada, “Docket 38921 – City of Toronto v. Attorney General of Ontario,” online: <www.scccsc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=38921> [perma.cc/8SN7-D6YF]. The Court has not yet ruled on a
late application for leave to intervene by Fair Voting British Columbia, which was filed on 15 December 2020.
45
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Factum of the Appellant – City of
Toronto) [SCC Factum (Toronto)]; SCC Factum (TDSB), supra note 5.
46
Supreme Court of Canada, “City of Toronto v. Attorney General of Ontario – Memorandums of Argument on
Application for Leave to Appeal),” online: <www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/mal-mdaa-eng.aspx?cas=38921>
[perma.cc/5V52-KC46]. The motions for leave to intervene are on file with the authors.
47
Court of Appeal for Ontario, “Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General),” online:
<www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/C65861/> [perma.cc/6WZK-47Z6].
48
The Canadian Taxpayers Foundation is not intervening at the Supreme Court. However, at the Court of Appeal, it
intervened to argue that unwritten principles cannot be used to invalidate legislation, and that doing so in this case
would have the effect of rewriting section 3 of the Charter: see Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019
ONCA 732 (Factum of the Intervenor – Canadian Taxpayers Foundation). Both the majority and the minority judges
explicitly held that unwritten constitutional principles do not have this effect on their own.
44
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A. THE APPELLANT’S POSITION
There are four legal issues on appeal, as framed by City of Toronto’s materials.49 First, does section
2(b) of the Charter protect the expression of electoral participants from substantial mid-election
changes to the election framework and rules? Second, can the unwritten principle of democracy
be used as a basis for striking down the impugned provisions of Bill 5? Third, are municipal
electors who are given a vote in a democratic election entitled to effective representation? And
fourth, has the Province met its burden under section 1 of justifying any Charter infringements?
The Appellant and associated intervenors can be expected to argue that section 2(b) (free
expression) of the Charter and section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (municipalities as a
provincial head of power) must be interpreted purposively with regard to—among other aids—the
unwritten principle of democracy, section 3 of the Charter (democratic rights), and the history and
present nature of Canadian municipalities. In their view, rights to free expression and unwritten
constitutional principles place constraints on the exercise of legislative authority vis-à-vis
municipal elections.
1. THE CITY OF TORONTO
On the first issue, the City argues that section 2(b) requires governments to refrain from making
substantial changes to the rules of an ongoing election where to do so would substantially impede
meaningful public discourse in that election. 50 The ability of electoral participants to engage in
political speech during an election depends on the stability and unchanging nature of the electoral
framework in which it takes place. Once an election begins, any material change to that framework
interferes with the ability of participants to express themselves and to engage in the political
discourse that is central to any democratic process. The City argues that this is not a case that
engages a positive right to a particular electoral process; rather, it pleads non-interference with an
established and ongoing electoral process.51 Furthermore, the City asks the Court to clearly limit
the application of the Baier framework to claims by excluded speakers for access to underinclusive
statutory platforms for expression. Instead, the broader Irwin Toy framework should apply to novel
freedom of expression claims such as the case at bar.
Second, the City argues that, contrary to the definitive statement of the Court of Appeal,
the Supreme Court has not confirmed whether unwritten constitutional principles have the
freestanding ability to render a law unconstitutional. 52 In support of this assertion, the City points
to several cases where the principles of judicial independence or the rule of law were employed to
support constitutional challenges to legislation. The City argues that, where such challenges have
been unsuccessful, it was because the applicant was unable to demonstrate that the impugned
legislation offended the unwritten principle at issue, and not because unwritten principles could
not be used to strike down legislation generally. 53 The City suggests that the unwritten principle
of democracy, in particular, can be defined with reference to the section 3 jurisprudence.54 On this

49

SCC Factum (Toronto), supra note 45.
Ibid at paras 7, 50, 58, 61.
51
Ibid at paras 44–49.
52
Ibid at paras 70–78.
53
Ibid at paras 75–77.
54
Ibid at paras 102–03.
50

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol34/iss1/1

8

Archer and Sobat: Better Local Government Act versus Municipal Democracy

basis, democratic municipal elections must at least provide for, among other things, effective
representation, non-interference, and meaningful participation.
Third, the City argues that the unwritten principle of democracy should influence the
interpretation of section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in the context of a statutory,
democratic municipal election. 55 Like the administration of justice under section 92(14) in Trial
Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia,56 for example, a province’s ability
to legislate over municipal institutions is not limitless. In this case, the unwritten principle of
democracy means that a province cannot create a statutory, democratic municipal election that
does not provide for effective representation of its residents.57
Fourth, the City argues that any infringement of section 2(b) of the Charter is not justified
under the section 1 Oakes test.58 The objective of achieving voter parity, though barely raised by
the government in relation to Bill 5, was not pressing and substantial given the Supreme Court’s
emphasis on effective representation as meaning more than mathematical parity. Similarly, the
Province had not adduced reliable evidence of the alleged ineffectiveness and inefficiency of City
Council to support this goal. Neither objective was rationally connected to Bill 5 because the
difference in ward populations between the two models is insignificant and there was no evidence
of fewer councillors leading to increased effectiveness. Bill 5 also was not minimally impairing:
if the provincial government had acted in accordance with the procedures of the City of Toronto
Act, it presumably could have made smaller, tailored changes to ward boundaries in areas of
concern while leaving the 47-ward model otherwise intact. As Justice Belobaba noted, there was
no evidence that a mid-election reduction in size was the only reasonable way to address the
effectiveness of City Council. 59 On the proportionality analysis, the alleged benefits were
speculative and unsupported by the evidence, while the deleterious effects on Torontonians and
the electoral process were extensive and profound.
2. THE CITY-ALIGNED INTERVENORS
The Toronto District School Board argues that the applicable test for a breach of section 2(b) of
the Charter is that from Irwin Toy, which is satisfied in this case. 60 The Supreme Court has
recognized both seeking election and voting as expressive acts. These separate incidents of
expression may also, together, be viewed as a form of collective political expression of the
community as a whole. Like trade unions in the section 2(d) jurisprudence, municipal and school
board elections constitute an important democratic subsystem that ought to receive Charter
protection. This collective expression was infringed, if not completely stifled, by Bill 5.
Furthermore, Bill 5’s changes to the Education Act and Regulations disrupted the political
expression of school board trustees, both previously during the Toronto Ward Boundary Review
and following the enactment of the changes when the province unilaterally threatened to impose
its own trustee distribution plan. This two-week ultimatum precluded trustees from expressing
their ideas on the boundaries or engaging in community consultations, undermining the core tenets
of democracy.
55

Ibid at paras 114–18.
2014 SCC 59 at para 26.
57
SCC Factum (Toronto), supra note 45 at paras 117–18.
58
Ibid at paras 132–50.
59
Application Reasons, supra note 9 at paras 70–77.
60
SCC Factum (TDSB), supra note 5.
56
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The David Asper Centre reiterates its arguments on freedom of expression that were
adopted by the minority of the Court of Appeal. 61 It argues that freedom of expression in the
electoral context goes beyond the one-way right of candidates and the electorate to express views
and cast ballots. Rather, this encompasses a wider framework for full deliberative engagement of
voters, incumbents, new candidates, volunteers, donors, campaign organizers and staff, and the
media. The expressive rights protected in an election are distinct and require a pre-determined,
stable electoral process to support the free political expression of all participants. This requires,
among other things, that electoral rules be clear from the beginning of the election period, that the
timing of the election be free from interference, and that candidates and the electorate know with
whom to communicate and how that communication will occur. Any disruption to this process,
such as through a mid-stream legislative change, interferes with section 2(b).
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association will deal primarily with the interpretation and
application of Baier.62 This case demonstrates the tension among the lower courts in choosing
whether to apply the Baier positive rights analysis or the broader Irwin Toy test for infringements
of section 2(b).63 The Court should therefore reconsider or at least restrict the application of Baier,
for example, in cases where core electoral speech is at stake. The focus of the section 2(b) inquiry
should properly be on whether the state’s conduct (in purpose or effect) is a non-trivial interference
in expressive content or activity, and not on drawing “delicate distinctions” between positive and
negative rights claims. Alternatively, the challenge to Bill 5 is not one of under-inclusion.
However, Bill 5 interferes with section 2(b) even under the Baier framework, because there is at
minimum a government obligation to establish clear ground rules and electoral boundaries in
advance of a municipal election to ensure that meaningful expressive activity can take place.
The Centre for Free Expression focuses on Bill 5’s interference with the electoral process,
namely in the timing of the legislation during the electoral period.64 This interfered with the
freedom of expression of candidates for office, members of their campaign teams, third party
participants, and the electorate. The Court should apply the Irwin Toy framework to make a
declaration that the legislation’s enactment during a subsisting democratic process violated section
2(b) rights, rather than invalidating the legislation itself.
The CityPlace Residents’ Association argues that the Court must consider municipal
electors as distinct from political candidates in its analysis.65 Section 2(b) protects the expressive
rights of prospective voters and Bill 5’s impact on their interests must be considered at every stage
of the electoral process. This is not limited to participation in the formal electoral period itself, but
also in pre-election democratic processes such as the Toronto Ward Boundary Review. The
unwritten constitutional principle of democracy similarly protects the participation of City
residents in this democratic consultation process. Electors’ expressive and democratic interests
were engaged as soon as the discussion on ward boundaries began and the government was
constitutionally obligated to respect this process once it was underway. Bill 5 therefore radically
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City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights).
62
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – Canadian Civil Liberties Association).
63
Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927.
64
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – Centre for Free Expression).
65
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – CityPlace Residents’ Association).
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and unjustifiably undermined a multi-year political conversation that began in 2013, rather than
only during the 2018 election period.
The Durham Community Legal Clinic highlights the disproportionate impacts of Bill 5 on
the expressive rights of low-income and historically marginalized communities.66 Such individuals
already have reduced access to the “marketplace of ideas” and effective representation, despite
being significantly affected by government decision-making. For example, low-income and
historically marginalized communities rely heavily on municipal services such as social housing
and tenant protections, and Bill 5 directly reduces their ability to participate in municipal processes
by increasing ward sizes. Bill 5’s expansion of Toronto District School Board wards similarly
impacted the ability of trustees to provide effective representation to residents who rely on the
public education system to transition out of poverty. The Court should consider these unique
impacts in assessing whether Bill 5’s infringement of section 2(b) is justifiable.
The International Commission of Jurists (Canada) does not argue that unwritten
constitutional principles can independently invalidate legislation.67 Rather, these principles can
properly fill an interpretive gap in this case by including the basic protections of section 3 within
section 2(b) rights in the context of municipal elections. Because the Province adopted a specific
model for democratic municipal institutions under section 92(8), the fundamental democratic
principles under section 3, as well as the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law,
preclude Ontario from undermining free expression in the electoral process. Amendments to
election rules when the election process is already underway limit the freedom of speech of
candidates. The proper test is therefore that from Irwin Toy and not Baier, although the Baier test
is also met. Had the amendments been made to the electoral process prior to the electoral period,
they might have been valid, provided they did not otherwise undermine the rule of law, democracy,
or constitutionalism.
In contrast, Progress Toronto argues that the constitutional principle of democracy does
have freestanding ability to invalidate legislation. 68 Unwritten principles are binding on courts and
governments and give rise to substantive legal obligations. Individual rights of participation in
political institutions, including municipal institutions, form the bedrock of the democracy
principle. Bill 5 was anti-democratic because it was passed without consultation and in the middle
of an election period. Progress Toronto also challenges the Court of Appeal’s argument that
invalidating legislation on this basis improperly places it beyond the scope of the notwithstanding
clause. It argues that this reasoning is incorrect as a matter of constitutional supremacy and the
fundamental nature of the constitutional principles. Progress Toronto will also draw on its
experience participating in the Toronto municipal election process to make submissions on how
the democracy principle should be addressed in the Court’s interpretation of section 2(b) rights.69

66

City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – Durham Community Legal Clinic)
67
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – International Commission of Jurists (Canada)).
68
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – Progress Toronto).
69
On this point, see also Michael Pal, “The Unwritten Principle of Democracy” (2019) 65:2 McGill LJ 269. Pal argues
that section 2(b) can be interpreted in light of the democracy principle, which should at least protect procedural fairness
and meaningful participation in municipal elections in order to safeguard political expression. Under this approach,
changing the rules of the game mid-election was a clear violation of section 2(b).
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The Métis Nations of Ontario and Alberta also challenge the conclusion that unwritten
constitutional principles can never be used to strike down legislation. 70 The unwritten principle of
democracy is conceptually similar to the “honour of the Crown” in Aboriginal law. As in that
context, constitutional principles combined with specific fact situations can generate legally
enforceable Crown duties that may require judicial remedies, including the invalidation of
legislation. Alternatively, the Court should distinguish the honour of the Crown as a sui generis
constitutional principle flowing from the unique relationship between the Crown and Indigenous
peoples. This would ensure that this concept is not inadvertently affected or altered in a case about
municipalities. Furthermore, pre-existing Aboriginal communities and Peoples have unique
constitutional status and—unlike municipalities—are not “creatures of statute” even when they
may be included in or subject to federal or provincial legislation.
The Federation of Canadian Municipalities reiterates arguments made at the Court of
Appeal that the Province’s exercise of authority under section 92(8) is constrained by the unwritten
principle of democracy.71 Municipal councils have a distinct, pre-Confederation history and
cardinal democratic role. This historical context, as well as the growing complexity and size of
cities, are relevant to the Court’s analysis. The exercise of the Province’s section 92(8) powers
through democratically elected municipal councils has always been part of the constitutional
framework. While the Province may have jurisdiction over the “architecture” of municipal
councils or their powers, it does not have the ability to abolish democracy in a given locality. 72
Finally, the Mayors’ group will argue that Bill 5 was both procedurally and substantively
outside the authority of the province. 73 The Court’s approach to section 2(b) must consider the
unique “conduit” role of elected officials—which requires close engagement with constituents—
when evaluating the disruptive nature of Bill 5 and its consequences for effective representation.
Section 2(b) protected the engagement of candidates with voters in the specific context of the preBill 5 ward model. Effective representation should be recognized under section 2(b) and requires
considering whether the electoral system promotes the election of individuals who are actually
representative of communities. The timing of Bill 5 magnified existing disparities between
candidates by undermining a ward system that allowed for increased diversity. Furthermore, the
independent status of cities as an order of government should be constitutionally recognized,
similar to the special status of courts under provincial jurisdiction. The contemporary importance
of cities means that they must be protected from outside meddling in their democracies, for
example, through implied limits to provincial authority under section 92(8).

B. THE RESPONDENT’S POSITION
The Respondents and associated intervenors can be expected to reiterate arguments made at the
Court of Appeal, particularly where they are reflected in the majority’s decision.
70

City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – Métis Nation of Ontario and Métis Nation of Alberta).
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City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
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72
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1. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
The AGO has made three key arguments about the application of the Charter to this case.74 First,
section 2(b) does not protect against “mid-election interference”; there is no Charter right to a
mid-campaign status quo or any particular ward model. 75 Section 2(b) protects meaningful
freedom of expression, not meaningful expression; there is no guaranteed protection of expression
that is effective in achieving its objective. The AGO argues that the City really seeks protection
for a particular platform for expression and not freedom from interference with expressive activity.
This is actually a positive rights claim but does not meet the test for such a claim from Baier.
Second, the AGO argues that the Charter’s protection of “effective representation” under
section 3 cannot be imported into section 2(b) for municipal government. 76 Section 3 applies only
to provincial and federal elections. Reading in such a right would create a third order of
government and rewrite the constitution. However, even under the effective representation
standard, there is no prescribed maximum constituent-councillor ratio. As such, Justice Belobaba
effectively constitutionalized the so-called “ombudsman” role of municipal councillors to deal
with constituent complaints about City services—a facet of municipal governance that is simply
not protected by the Charter.
Finally, unwritten constitutional principles of democracy or the rule of law do not support
the invalidation of Bill 5.77 While unwritten principles may occasionally be used as an interpretive
aid to fill a true gap in the written text of the constitution, where there is no such gap, they cannot
be used to rewrite the text. If unwritten principles are used to invalidate legislation, there would
be no opportunity to justify state action under section 1 of the Charter as there is with other rights,
which would be contrary to the overall constitutional architecture. Furthermore, democracy and
the rule of law were respected in this case under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The
Legislative Assembly, and not City Council, is the democratically elected constitutional body with
authority over municipalities. The rule of law as applicable to the legislative branch means only
that the legislature must comply with legislated requirements as to manner and form.
Although it was ultimately not necessary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, the AGO
also argued there that if a Charter infringement was found, it was nonetheless justified under
section 1.78 Justice Belobaba erred in finding that the objectives of improving City Council
efficiency and improving voter parity were not pressing and substantial. Since the 47-ward model
would not have achieved the Legislature’s objectives, the Province was under no obligation to
adopt it in order to satisfy the minimal impairment branch. The City’s post-election changes to
Council governance and councillor resources demonstrated that the change did not jeopardize the
councillor ombudsman role. Adopting the federal election boundaries achieved voter parity in
2018, rather than by 2026, as would have been the case under the 47-ward model.
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City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument of the
Respondent – Attorney General of Ontario) [MOA (Ontario)].
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Ibid at paras 47–53.
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Ibid at paras 56–60.
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Ibid at paras 61–65.
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Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732 (Factum of the Appellant – Attorney General of
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The Court has also granted the AGO’s motion to adduce new evidence regarding the
interpretation of Bill 5.79 This means the appeal will be decided on a broader evidentiary record—
including post-election evidence—than that considered by the courts below.
2. THE ONTARIO-ALIGNED INTERVENORS
The Canadian Constitution Foundation also reiterates its arguments on constitutional interpretation
from the Court of Appeal.80 First, the Court should focus on identifying the scope of a particular
Charter right through textual interpretation to determine what it does and does not cover, rather
than relying too heavily on the section 1 justificatory stage. Second, unwritten constitutional
principles cannot be used to expand the scope of Charter rights. In other words, purposive
interpretation should be an exercise in identifying a right’s ambit, beginning with the text rather
than “judicial elaborations” through the case law (or unwritten principles), in order to determine
what is excluded from coverage. Courts’ preference for relying on the inherently more subjective
section 1 analysis opens the door to judicial discretion and, while taking a broad view of rights at
the outset, ultimately makes their guarantee less certain across cases. It does not appear that the
Court of Appeal paid much attention to this urged interpretive approach.
It is not yet certain what arguments will be raised by the Attorneys General of Canada and
British Columbia. However, it is expected that they will intervene primarily or exclusively on
matters of Charter interpretation. For example, the federal government may argue that section 3
of the Charter should not be used to interpret section 2(b), which would be consistent with their
position in other cases. 81 Similarly, British Columbia may address whether unwritten
constitutional principles can constrain the interpretation of section 92(8) of the Constitution Act,
1867. Both may argue, like the AGO, that unwritten constitutional principles do not have
freestanding force to invalidate duly passed legislation.

II. OTHER THEORIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF
MUNICIPALITIES
This summary of the positions and arguments reflects what the parties have crafted as answerable
questions for the Court. There are other theories of the case—or more generally, proposed
solutions to the constitutional conundrum of municipalities’ exclusion from section 3 of the
Charter. Before canvassing these arguments, we note that while the Supreme Court has
commented on the non-application of section 3 to municipalities, the Court has never squarely
addressed this question in the context of a municipal election based on a full record. Rather, the

See Supreme Court of Canada, “Decision on motion to adduce new evidence” (28 August 2020), online: <www.scccsc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=38921> [perma.cc/7K2U-A5MP].
80
City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2020 CanLII 23630 (SCC) (Memorandum of Argument on Motion
for Leave to Intervene – Canadian Constitution Foundation). The CCF now points to the methodology endorsed in the
recent case of Quebec (Attorney General) v 9147-0732 Québec Inc., 2020 SCC 32.
81
See e.g. Haig v Canada, [1993] 2 SCR 995; Harper v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33; Baier, supra note
20.
79
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Court’s substantive cases on delegated electoral frameworks address referenda (Haig) and school
board elections (Baier).82

A. “READING IN”
Perhaps the most direct proposal comes from Colin Feasby, who has argued that the gap in
constitutional protection of municipal democratic rights should be filled by “reading in”
municipalities to section 3 of the Charter.83 He begins from the proposition that the Court’s section
3 jurisprudence has made elections more fair and democratic, while electoral processes outside of
its ambit—referenda, band council elections, municipal elections, school board elections—are
often equally if not more important to Canadians. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has interpreted
section 3 as more than merely a formal right to cast a ballot or stand for election. For example, in
provincial and federal elections, section 3 includes the right to effective representation 84 and
meaningful participation.85 Here, Feasby adopts Yasmin Dawood’s conceptualization of
democratic rights as “structural rights.”86 These entitlements, such as the right to vote or to stand
for election, are defined largely by their institutional context; they cannot be properly understood
without reference to the institutional framework of elections and the structure of our political
system. Professor Dawood has argued that the Supreme Court’s recognition of a “bundle” of
democratic rights enables it to play a regulatory or supervisory role in the democratic process—
particularly to avoid and remedy partisan self-dealing by those elected representatives who set
electoral rules.
Against this backdrop, Feasby suggests that an overly narrow approach to interpreting
section 3 has deprived courts of the tools to regulate the democratic process outside of federal and
provincial elections. He suggests that rather than this narrow approach (which has prompted
attempts to fit democratic rights under section 2(b)), the Court should establish a new rule: “Where
a government, Federal or Provincial, delegates a legislative role to a democratically chosen body
or where a government, Federal or Provincial, effectively delegates a decision to the electorate in
a referendum, section 3 of the Charter applies.” In other words, when a legislature delegates lawmaking to a democratically elected body (as opposed to some other kind of administrative body),
section 3 protections for democratic processes should follow. Otherwise, a legislative body
governed by section 3 can delegate its power to an elected body chosen by electors with lesser
constitutional protections. He notes that this is consistent with the constitutional principle of
democracy, the intuition of Justice Belobaba in City of Toronto and other SCC jurisprudence, and
Canada’s commitments under Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (which is analogous to section 3 but without limits based on level of government).
82

In a municipal amalgamation case, Sinclair v Quebec (Attorney General), 1991 CanLII 36 (SCC), [1991] 3 SCR
134, the section 3 issue was dismissed orally (the court delivered written reasons on a separate official languages
issue). For a discussion, see Alexandra Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority: The Case of
Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review” (2019) 56:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 271.
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Bruce Ryder has expressed a similar argument.87 He suggests that bodies delegating their
law-making powers under section 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 must do so through a fair
electoral process that complies with section 3 of the Charter. This would prevent provincial
legislatures from circumventing the Constitution through delegation. Ryder has further noted that
Feasby’s argument resonates with comments made by Justice La Forest in Godbout v Longueuil
(City):88
The possibility that the Canadian Charter might apply to entities other than
Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the federal or provincial governments is, of
course, explicitly contemplated by the language of s. 32(1) inasmuch as entities that
are controlled by government or that perform truly governmental functions are
themselves “matters within the authority” of the particular legislative body that created
them. Moreover, interpreting s. 32 as including governmental entities other than those
explicitly listed therein is entirely sensible from a practical perspective. Were
the Charter to apply only to those bodies that are institutionally part of government
but not to those that are – as a simple matter of fact – governmental in nature (or
performing a governmental act), the federal government and the provinces could easily
shirk their Charter obligations by conferring certain of their powers on other entities
and having those entities carry out what are, in reality, governmental activities or
policies. In other words, Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the federal and
provincial executives could simply create bodies distinct from themselves, vest those
bodies with the power to perform governmental functions and, thereby, avoid the
constraints imposed upon their activities through the operation of the Charter. Clearly,
this course of action would indirectly narrow the ambit of protection afforded by
the Charter in a manner that could hardly have been intended and with consequences
that are, to say the least, undesirable. Indeed, in view of their fundamental
importance, Charter rights must be safeguarded from possible attempts to narrow their
scope unduly or to circumvent altogether the obligations they engender.
There are echoes of this theory in the proposed submissions of several intervenors. For
example, the International Commission of Jurists (Canada) asks the Court to effectively read in
constitutional protection for municipalities via the “gap-filling” role of the unwritten principle of
democracy. In the Commission’s submission, however, this protection would be limited to
ensuring non-interference in an ongoing electoral process. The Mayors’ group also argues for
recognition of municipalities as an independent order of government with effective autonomy over
local decision-making.

B. “MANNER AND FORM” CONSTRAINTS

See Bruce Ryder, “Bill 5, the so-called ‘Better Local Government Act, 2018’…” (30 July 2018), online: Twitter
<twitter.com/BBRyder/status/1024043534683398149>; Bruce Ryder, “Thoughtful piece by @ColinFeasby…” (28
September 2018), online: Twitter <twitter.com/BBRyder/status/1045745151342247936> [perma.cc/9F7G-PCG9].
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Craig Scott has suggested that “manner and form” limits on amending the City of Toronto Act,
2006 were not observed in the enactment of Bill 5.89 This principle is “a little-discussed doctrine
of Westminster constitutionalism” that operates to place legislative constraints on parliamentary
supremacy.90 Manner and form refers to a statutory requirement that one legislature seeks to
impose on future legislatures in the form of either preconditions to inhibit, or permissions to
facilitate, the enactment, amendment, or repeal of certain statutes. For example, a government
might be required by statute to conduct a public consultation and table a report in the legislature
before re-enacting a piece of legislation with a sunset clause. This can be circumvented through a
two-step process during a legislative sitting that, first, repeals the manner and form rule(s) and,
second, enacts the substantive statutory amendment or repeal. However, Scott and others have
speculated that, if a legislature made a manner and form rule itself subject to a manner and form
requirement, this might foreclose the two-step option for amendment or repeal. 91
Scott notes that the pre-Bill 5 City of Toronto Act, 2006 contained a kind of manner and
form rule, the purpose of which was to prevent amendments to City Council composition in an
election year. The Act had a primacy clause that made the City’s bylaws on Council composition
superior to other provincial law. 92 Section 135(4) further provided that if such a bylaw was passed
in the year of a regular election and before voting day, it would not come into force until after the
second regular election following the passage of the bylaw (i.e., not until 2022 in the context of
Bill 5). Scott argued that in light of the constitutional principles of democracy and the rule of law,
section 135(4) should be read as constitutionally barring the amendment of Council composition
rules if the amendment is intended to affect an election in the same year as its enactment.93 For its
part, the Attorney General of Ontario has argued that any manner and form requirements were
respected.94

C. UNCONSTITUTIONAL WARD BOUNDARIES
Finally, Michael Pal has argued that the new City ward boundaries, which are the same as those
used in federal and provincial elections, are themselves unconstitutional because they fail to

See Craig Scott, “Why fundamental constitutional principles should prevent Ontario from interfering with Toronto’s
election,” The Star (2 August 2018), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2018/08/02/why-fundamentalconstitutional-principles-should-prevent-ontario-from-interfering-with-torontos-election.html>
[perma.cc/SYT79SZ5].
90
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Mikisew Cree II” (2019) 94 SCLR (2nd) 155. This is a limited exception to the general principle that a current
legislature cannot bind a future legislature.
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See e.g. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: 2016 Student Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) at
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Municipalities’ Constitutional Status,” Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG Papers on Municipal
Finance and Governance, No 46, 2019) at 20–27. This would effectively be a way to “constitutionalize” the rule.
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provide effective representation under section 3 of the Charter.95 The federal boundary
commission that established these electoral ridings in 2013 did not prioritize representation by
population or voter parity and accepted ridings with very different population numbers.96 This
resulted in significant discrepancies even within the same city. For example, in Toronto, according
to 2016 census data, Don Valley East has approximately 95,000 residents, while Etobicoke
Lakeshore has 129,000.97 Canadian courts have often accepted large deviations from
representation by population for rural and remote areas, for example in the Saskatchewan
Boundaries Reference.98 However, that was in 1991 in a geographically large province. Here, the
significant variation within the same city dilutes the voting power of residents in larger ridings. It
is also true of many ridings outside of the Greater Toronto Area. Thus, it is an open question
whether a court today would find the current federal-provincial riding map to be constitutional
under section 3. A successful challenge to these districts would not technically prevent their use
municipally, but it is unlikely that they would still be used for the City of Toronto if found
unconstitutional for federal elections. While section 3 may not directly apply to municipal
elections, it applies to the ward map now in place in Toronto. Thus, any change to the federalprovincial map would at the very least have an indirect, political effect on municipal wards.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE
This special volume places Bill 5 and these constitutional theories in their wider historical, social,
and political context. Several of these contributions were originally presented at a workshop on
“The legal and political status of local democracy in Canada,” hosted by the Centre for
Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at the University of Toronto on 27 September 2019. This
session brought together lawyers and academics to discuss the constitutional role of municipalities
and municipal democracy in Canada. This special volume continues that discussion by bringing
together contributions from scholars and community members whose lives and work have been
affected by Bill 5 or who have engaged with wider debates on municipal democracy.
Mariana Valverde opens the volume by looking beyond the standard account of how
municipal government developed in Ontario (i.e., the slow incorporation of cities and towns and
incremental expansion of local democracy over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). Instead,
she uncovers the complex, multiplayer games of jurisdiction that actually characterize local
government on-the-ground. Like in the First Nations context, Valverde argues that jurisdictional
disputes are not based on zero-sum assertions of sovereignty so much as dynamic efforts to claim,
negotiate, expand, and even disavow power in particular contexts. She then reviews the history of
municipal structures in Ontario, tracing provincial efforts to systematize and curtail the powers of
local governments. In contrast, federal interventions have skirted the “creatures of the province”
doctrine without explicitly challenging it. Valverde’s review supports the conclusion that
municipal incorporation was invented not to empower citizens but rather to further colonial
administrative aims. At the same time, the monopolization of political and legal power by the two
Michael Pal, “The new City boundaries are the same as those used for provincial + federal elections…” (15 August
2018), online: Twitter <twitter.com/mikepalcanada/status/1029785982948790272> [perma.cc/8QDA-VB5S]. See
also Pal, “The Unwritten Principle of Democracy”, supra note 69 at 297.
96
See Michael Pal, “The Fractured Right to Vote: Democracy, Discretion, and Designing Electoral Districts” (2015)
61:2 McGill LJ 231 at 255–58.
97
See City of Toronto, “Ward Profiles,” online: <www.toronto.ca/city-government/data-researchmaps/neighbourhoods-communities/ward-profiles/> [perma.cc/6KAU-TRN4].
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Crowns has always been more of an aspirational claim than a reality, with jurisdictional games
often leading to unpredictable results. Constitutional arguments should therefore be supplemented
by evidence about actual practices of local democracy.
Beginning with the same legal fiction—that municipalities are “creatures of provincial
statute”—Nathalie DesRosiers considers the degree of deference that courts should give to rightsinfringing legislative enactments. After surveying the case law and commentary on deference
generally, DesRosiers questions the judicial approach to deference where democratic rights are
affected. She argues that courts should be less deferential where core democratic rights are
attenuated and sets out a six-point framework to guide the analysis in such cases. DesRosiers then
applies this analytical framework to the enactment of Bill 5. She finds that the legislative debate
surrounding the passing of Bill 5 focused on the question of whether the government had a political
mandate (having failed to campaign on the issue), but also included debate on expertise, elector
and candidate rights, failure to consult, proper procedure, and finally, partisan motives. Her
analysis leads to the conclusion that the legislative process did not meet the standards of conduct
required when altering democratic rights (focus, deliberation, and participation) that justify
deference from courts. Finally, she situates this conclusion within the wider dialogue between the
courts and legislatures.
Kate Glover Berger examines similar issues through the lens of judicial review. She
focuses on the new approach to judicial review from Canada v Vavilov, decided by the Supreme
Court of Canada in 2019. Berger considers the implications of an inconsistency between legislation
and underlying unwritten constitutional principles as well as the significance of institutional design
to understanding the role, relationships, and reform of public actors. Central to her discussion is
the concept of “structural constitutionalism”: the relationships between the judiciary,
administrative state, executive, legislatures, and the public that are at issue, expressly or implicitly,
in all cases of judicial review. She argues that when the Supreme Court took on the task of
reframing judicial review in Vavilov, it should have drawn more heavily on insights from
architectural features of the constitution (structural constitutionalism) and from the relationship
between administrative decision-making and constitutional interpretation (administrative
constitutionalism). Taking Bill 5 as a case study, this approach would have promoted the
development of a consistent vision of the grand constitutional order across constitutional and
administrative law.
Benoît Fraite and David Robitaille shift the discussion away from the City of Toronto to
trans-border issues that affect municipalities more broadly. Their case study looks at proposals for
oil and gas pipelines that cross municipal boundaries. The authors begin by tracing some of the
contours of expanded municipal powers (developed through provincial legislative acts, and in
particular, by denoting “spheres of jurisdiction”) during the 1990s and 2000s, trends which, the
authors suggest, responded to the emerging needs of cities. This statutory expansion was also
reflected in judicial decision-making. The discussion then turns to the applicability of municipal
ordinance in areas of federal jurisdiction—such as inter-provincial pipelines—and notes that courts
have slowly found that municipal ordinance will apply in federal jurisdictions unless there is an
irreconcilable conflict. The authors argue that there are effectively four coordinate (i.e., nonsubordinated) jurisdictions at play—federal, provincial, Aboriginal, and municipal—and that they
should be treated as such notwithstanding the otherwise subordinate nature of municipal
jurisdiction.
Alexandra Flynn examines the interaction of municipal democracy (and its debates) with
Aboriginal title and Indigenous rights. Flynn notes that about half of all Indigenous people in
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Canada live in cities, and many First Nations have treaty and land interests both within and
adjacent to cities. Given protections under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, any reform of
municipal governance is likely to affect these rights and interests. Flynn provides an assessment
of issues and options that allow cities to more effectively regulate themselves (and all municipal
authority), namely constitutional amendment, legislative enactment, or judicial decision-making,
as well as some international comparisons. She goes on to note that there is not yet an independent
duty for municipalities to consult Indigenous peoples and communities despite the effects of
municipal decision-making on their rights and interests. Notwithstanding this lack of protection,
Flynn describes some of the current initiatives in Toronto to integrate Indigenous representation
and voice in municipal institutions. Flynn argues that the use of section 43 of the Constitution Act,
1982 (the legal avenue proposed by John Sewell in this volume) and other mechanisms to bolster
municipal authority must include consideration of Aboriginal and Treaty rights and the interests
of urban Indigenous peoples.
In the Voices and Perspectives section of the volume, Prabha Khosla and Melissa Wong
offer a behind-the-scenes look at the 2018 Toronto municipal election before and after Bill 5.
Khosla and Wong worked with Women Win Toronto (WWTO), a program initiated by a group of
experienced women political campaigners. Khosla and Wong tell the story of WWTO through
some of its members and their campaigns in the 2018 election—or at least, those that were
developed until Bill 5 was enacted. Khosla and Wong provide an on-the-ground description of
how candidates organize to run for municipal office, as well as the barriers that women and
racialized candidates face against predominantly white and male incumbents. The Toronto Ward
Boundary Review process that preceded the 2018 election increased the number of wards in part
to assist with opening up new opportunities for traditionally excluded candidates. As Khosla and
Wong report, many women and racialized candidates spent over a year building their campaigns
in anticipation of the first election under this new ward model. A significant part of the planning
and resources that went into those campaigns was rendered useless or irrelevant by Bill 5. They
conclude their piece with recommendations for ensuring City Council better reflects the City’s
diverse population.
In the final contribution to the special volume, John Sewell explores one possibility for
legally cementing municipalities as an order of government: a proposed “Charter City” of Toronto
with constitutional protection for a defined jurisdiction. The proposal is not new: as Valverde
discusses in her essay, proposals for city “charters” date back to at least the 1880s in Ontario.
Sewell makes the case for a degree of autonomous local government in Toronto based on the
radical change in population demographics since Confederation and the political manipulation of
local affairs by provincial governments. He then outlines the process for approving a charter city
under section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Sewell introduces the specific charter proposal for
Toronto, which would include jurisdiction over land-use planning, housing, roads, health, and
education, and shared jurisdiction over social services, migration and settlement services, and
policing. Fiscally, the City would have full control over property taxation and shared (but
guaranteed) access to a portion of income and excise taxes. In sum, Toronto would be a
constitutionally protected order of government, with its own jurisdiction to legislate and tax.
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